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INVITED REVIEW
Emotion and persuasion: Cognitive and meta-cognitive
processes impact attitudes
5 Richard E. Petty1 and Pablo Briñol2
1Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
2Department of Psychology, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
10 This article addresses the multiple ways in which emotions can influence attitudes and persuasion via
primary and secondary (meta-) cognition. Using the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion as a
guide, we review evidence for five fundamental processes that occur at different points along the
elaboration continuum. When the extent of thinking is constrained to be low, emotions influence
attitudes by relatively simple processes that lead them to change in a manner consistent with the
15 valence of the emotion. When thinking is constrained to be high, emotions can serve as arguments in
favour of a proposal if they are relevant to the merits of the advocacy or they can bias thinking if the
emotion precedes the message. If thinking is high and emotions become salient after thinking, they
can lead people to rely or not rely on the thoughts generated either because the emotion leads people
to like or dislike their thoughts (affective validation) or feel more confident or doubtful in their
20 thoughts (cognitive validation). When thinking is unconstrained, emotions influence the extent of
thinking about the persuasive communication. Although prior theories have addressed one or more of
these fundamental processes, no other approach has integrated them into one framework.
Keywords: Attitudes; Persuasion; Elaboration likelihood model.
25 One of the most fundamental and encompassing
aspects of human existence is the experience of
emotion. People often rely on their emotions,
either intentionally or unintentionally, to shape a
wide variety of judgements including social, polit-
30 ical, personal and economic decisions (e.g., Forgas,
2001 AQ1). Because of their importance, emotions have
been studied extensively in the domain of attitudes
and persuasion (see Petty, Fabrigar, & Wegener,
2003). To be clear about the meaning of our key
35terms, attitudes refer to general evaluations people
have regarding people (including oneself), places,
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objects and issues. Attitudes are critical to
decision-making and behaviour in that people
tend to engage in relationships with people they
40 like, purchase the items they value and avoid
behaviours that are viewed negative. Importantly,
attitudes are not only based on thoughts and
beliefs but also feelings and emotions (Crites,
Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994). We use the term emotion
45 rather broadly to refer to both specific feeling
states such as anger and happiness (e.g., Ekman,
1972) and to more diffuse affective states that are
sometimes referred to as moods (e.g., Forgas,
1995; cf., Clore, 1992). Finally, persuasion typically
50 involves an attempt to bring about a change in
attitudes as a result of providing information on a
topic (e.g., delivering a message).
The available research reveals that a person’s
emotions, whether stemming from the persuasive
55 message (e.g., fear appeals), attitude object (e.g., a
funny comedian) or incidental contextual factors
(e.g., a sad television programme that surrounds an
advertisement) can influence evaluative judgements
through multiple cognitive and meta-cognitive
60 processes. Much of the work on emotion and
attitudes has been conducted under the umbrella
of the dominant dual and multi-process theories of
persuasion. In order to provide a general framework
to understand what effects emotions can produce
65 and to organise the mechanisms by which emotions
produce their effects on attitudes and other judge-
ments, we rely on the elaboration likelihood
model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty &
Briñol, 2012).
70 Described briefly, the ELM holds that changes
in attitudes and other judgements result from
different psychological processes depending upon
the extent of elaboration the individual is engaging
in at the time of influence. The extent of
75 elaboration in any given persuasion context is set
by a host of individual and situational factors
which determine how motivated and how able the
person is to think about the influence attempt.
The ELM proposes that judgements can be
80modified by processes that involve relatively high
or low amounts of issue-relevant thinking and
emotions can work to influence judgements in
different ways depending on the overall degree of
elaboration. Put simply, the amount of thinking at
85the time of influence moderates the process by
which emotions have their effect on judgement
(i.e., moderated mediation). Another core ELM
postulate is that the extent of thinking involved in
creating a judgement determines how consequen-
90tial that judgement will be (i.e., the extent to
which the judgement is enduring and impactful;
see Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1985 AQ2).
In accord with the ELM, we argue that the
psychological processes relevant to the impact of
95emotions on attitudes can be organised into a finite
set that operate at different points along the
elaboration continuum. Specifically, the ELM
holds that under relatively low thinking conditions,
emotions, like other variables, tend to influence
100attitudes by a variety of low effort processes such as
classical conditioning or reliance on simple infer-
ences. When the likelihood of thinking is relatively
high, these same emotions can impact persuasion
by other mechanisms such as by affecting the
105direction of the thoughts that come to mind (i.e.,
biasing thinking), evaluating one’s feelings as argu-
ments, or emotion can determine whether people
use their thoughts or not.1 AQ3Furthermore, emotions
can influence attitudes by determining the amount
110of thinking that takes place when elaboration is not
already constrained by other variables to be very low
or high. We describe each of these processes in
more detail in the next sections of this review.
We begin our review of the processes by which
115emotions influence attitudes by focusing first on
dimensions of primary cognition. Primary thoughts
are those that involve people’s initial associations of
some object with some attribute (e.g., the car is
green; my laptop makes me happy). Following a
120primary thought, people can also generate other
1 Thought usage refers to people relying on their thoughts in forming judgements. When thoughts are used, the degree of
positive and negative thoughts generated should be more predictive of the attitudes formed than when thoughts are not used
(Petty et al., 2002).
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thoughts, which occur at a second level and
involve meta-cognitive reflections on the first-level
thoughts and the processes leading to them (e.g.,
I am certain that the car is green; Jost, Kruglanski,
125 & Nelson, 1998; Petty, Briñol, Tormala, &
Wegener, 2007). In the second part of our review,
we focus on meta-cognitive processes, describing
recent work that reveals that emotions can influence
attitudes by affecting how people think and feel
130 about their own thoughts and thought processes.
Finally, we distinguish among the processes by
which emotions operate, and specify the conditions
under which the various mechanisms are particu-
larly likely to occur. Identifying the specific pro-
135 cesses by which emotions affect attitudes is
informative about the immediate and long-term
consequences of persuasion.
THE IMPACT OF EMOTIONS ON
PRIMARY COGNITION
140 The ELM describes four ways in which emotions,
like any other variable present in the persuasion
setting (e.g., a credible source), can influence
attitudes by impacting primary cognition. These
processes are described next along with the con-
145 ditions under which they operate. A fifth mech-
anism is described in the subsequent section on
secondary cognition.
Emotions can serve as simple cues
when elaboration is low
150 According to the ELM, when people are not very
motivated (e.g., low personal relevance message;
Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) or able (e.g., high
distraction context; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976)
to think carefully about an influence attempt,
155 persuasion-relevant variables such as emotion
have an impact on attitudes through relatively
low effort (peripheral route) processes (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Cacioppo, Sedikides, &
Strathman, 1988). In these situations, emotions
160 impact attitudes in accord with their valence. That
is, if the attitude object is associated with a
positive emotional state or feeling (e.g., happi-
ness), that object will be liked more than if
associated with a negative emotional state or
165feeling (e.g., fear).
There are many instances in the literature
whereby emotions have been shown to influence
evaluation of stimuli in accord with their valence
when thinking was likely not very extensive. For
170example, the voluminous literature on evaluative
conditioning provides many instances whereby
attitudes towards objects or issues were made
more negative by pairing them with unpleasant
stimuli and more positive by pairing them with
175pleasant stimuli in situations where thinking was
likely to be low (see De Houwer, Thomas, &
Baeyens, 2001; Walther, Weil, & Dusing, 2011).
In series of studies (Jones, Fazio, & Olson, 2009),
for instance, cartoon characters were momentarily
180paired with emotionally evocative pictures. Atti-
tudes towards the cartoon characters consistently
became more positive when the paired pictures
elicited positive rather than negative emotional
reactions.
185In a recent review, Greifeneder, Bless, and Pham
(2011) identified a dozen studies that explicitly
varied the extent of thinking and found that
emotions were more likely to have a relatively
simple and “direct” effect on judgements when
190thinking was low rather than high (e.g., Bosmans &
Baumgartner, 2005; Pham, Cohen, Pracejus, &
Hughes, 2001). In the first report demonstrating
this (Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman,
1993), an advertisement for a pen was placed in the
195context of a humorous or neutral television pro-
gramme. To vary the extent of thinking about the
pen ad, prior to the programme participants were
either told that at the end of the study they would
have a chance to select a brand of pen as a free gift
200(high relevance of pen ad leading to high thinking
about it) or that they would select from among
brands of coffee (low relevance of pen ad leading to
less thinking about it). Attitudes and thoughts
about the pen were measured after the programme.
205The results showed that attitudes towards the pen
were influenced by the emotional content of the
programme under both high and low thinking
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conditions (i.e., more favourable attitudes towards
the pen when the television programme was posit-
210 ive rather than neutral), but in the high thinking
condition, the impact of the emotion induced was
mediated by valenced thoughts (i.e., the humorous
programme led to more favourable thoughts about
the pen which led to more favourable attitudes). In
215 the low thinking condition, however, emotion had
a direct impact on attitudes unmediated by thought
content.
A number of specific low effort psychological
processes have been proposed to explain how
220 emotions can influence attitudes when thinking
is low, including classical conditioning (Staats &
Staats, 1958), use of emotion-based heuristics
(Chaiken, 1987; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), mis-
attribution of one’s emotional state to the attitude
225 object (Greifeneder et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2009;
Zillmann, 1978AQ4 ) and direct affect transfer (e.g.,
Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Payne, 2005). In each of
these accounts, although the emotion actually
arises from a factor that is incidental to the object,
230 the persuasive message, and the attitude, when
thinking is low, the emotion nonetheless impacts
attitudes towards the associated target of influence
in accord with its valence. This is because these
accounts basically hold that incidental emotion is
235 automatically or deliberatively misattributed to
one’s attitude (my positive feeling reflects my
positive attitude), the message (my good feeling
means I agree with the message) or the attitude
object (the object is making me feel good, so I
240 must like it). Although the various individual
accounts of low effort emotional impact differ in
certain ways, they all agree that the impact of
emotion does not require much in the way
of cognitive motivation or capacity, and the effect
245 of the emotion is consistent with its valence.
Emotions can serve as arguments when
elaboration is high
Although the simplest and most straightforward
effect of emotions on attitudes is as a simple cue or
250 input to a simple inference under low thinking
conditions, emotions can also be impactful when
motivation and ability to think are high. Indeed, in
these situations the impact of emotion on judge-
ment can equal or even exceed the impact under low
255thinking situations. However, when thinking is
high, the mechanisms by which emotions exert
their impact on judgement are different.
First, in thoughtful situations, one’s emotions
can be scrutinised as a piece of evidence relevant to
260the merits of the attitude object. According to the
ELM, when the amount of thinking is high, people
assess the relevance of all of the information in the
context and that comes to mind in order to
determine the merits of the attitude object under
265consideration. If emotional reactions are judged to
be relevant to the judgement at hand, one’s feelings
will be scrutinised for their merits as evidence to
favour or disfavour the attitude object. Put simply,
does the emotion provide a good or a bad reason
270(argument) to like or dislike something?
For example, in one study conducted under the
umbrella of the mood as input approach (Martin,
Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993), Martin, Abend,
Sedikides, and Green (1997) presented people who
275were either feeling happy or sad with either a happy
or sad story. Participants were asked to evaluate the
story and their liking for it. In these circumstances,
the emotion people felt when reading the story was
likely to be perceived as a relevant to the merits of
280the story since the target story was obviously meant
to bring about a particular feeling. Consistent with
this notion, participants’ evaluative rating of the
target story was highest when the emotion induced
before the story matched rather than mismatched
285the intended effect of the story. Thus, when the
purpose of the target story was to make people feel
sad and people did feel sad, sadness actually led to
more positive ratings of the story than did happi-
ness. Note that this is opposite to the effect that
290these emotions would have as simple cues under
low thinking conditions (for a related analysis using
fear inductions and horror stories, see Andrade &
Cohen, 2007).
Perhaps the most studied persuasion context in
295which emotions are scrutinised for their eviden-
tiary value concerns fear appeals such as when a
message emphasises the dire consequences (e.g.,
c:/3b2win/temp files/PCEM_A_967183_O_ANN.3d 1st October 2014 1:38:21
PETTY AND BRIÑOL
4 COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2014, 00 (00)
  
 
death, disease) of not agreeing with the commun-
icator. According to the ELM, fear appeals would
300 not tend to work well under low thinking condi-
tions because fear is negative in valence. Instead,
fear would work better when people can figure out
the implications of the fear. Thus, as postulated by
Rogers’ (1983)AQ5 protection motivation theory, fear
305 appeals tend to be successful only indirectly, when
fear influences beliefs about the severity of the
threat (Rogers, 1983) and people also come to
believe the fearful consequences postulated can be
avoided if the recommended action is followed;
310 see Witte, 1992). Thus, the fearful consequences
can be seen as an argument for following the
recommendation.2
The impact of emotions as evidence is com-
parable to how other non-emotional variables are
315 treated in the ELM such as when an attractive
spokesperson is evaluated positively as evidence for
the effectiveness of a relevant consumer product
(e.g., a skin cream) under high thinking conditions
but serves as a simple positive cue for an irrelevant
320 product (e.g., a new car) when thinking is low.
Thus, according to the ELM, the relevance of the
emotion to the judgement and its perceived merits
should be more important under high than under
low thinking conditions (Petty & Cacioppo,
325 1984b; see also, Pierro, Mannetti, Kruglanski, &
Sleeth-Keppler, 2004).
To summarise so far, under low thinking
conditions, the key aspect of the emotion is its
valence. For example, standing in a disorienting
330 bank lobby might cause a person to feel queasy. If
a survey taker asked for an opinion of the bank at
the moment, without thinking much the person
could report a negative attitude—misattributing
the queasy feeling to one’s attitude about the bank.
335 The merits of the emotion and its relevance are
not much of a consideration under low thinking
conditions—all that matters is the valence of the
experienced affect. With a greater opportunity to
reflect, however, the appearance of the bank lobby
340and the queasiness it induces could be dismissed as
an irrelevant (or weak) argument to avoid the
bank. Indeed, the person might recall that the
bank has the highest interest rate in town and
most banking is done online.
345Emotions can bias cognition when
elaboration is high
Even if emotion is not impactful when it is assessed
as a relevant argument, a second way that emotions
can influence attitudes under high thinking condi-
350tions is by biasing the thoughts that come to mind
about the message or attitude object. This process is
much more subtle than using emotion as an
argument which requires that the emotion be
salient and analysed. For emotion to bias thinking,
355it is likely better that the emotion and its source not
be very salient. The idea that emotion can bias
cognition stems in part from associative network
theories of memory which hold that emotions can
enhance the retrieval of emotionally congruent
360information and inhibit emotionally incongruent
information (Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1981). That is,
these models make a fairly straightforward predic-
tion that when an emotion such as happiness is
induced above some threshold, activation spreads
365throughout the network to associated information.
Thus, when happy, a heightened accessibility of
memories and experiences associated with happi-
ness will come to mind and can therefore colour
one’s assessment of the information presented.
370Stated simply, a positivity bias in thinking can
occur when people are happy which would make
interpretations of message arguments more favour-
able than they would have been in a non-happy
state and can lead positive events and outcomes
375mentioned in a message to be seen as more likely
(Johnson & Tversky, 1983) or desirable (Petty &
Wegener, 1991). The opposite can occur for
negative emotions.
2 It is also possible that fear could bias perception of the severity of the consequences proposed in the message such as
making the threats seem more likely or undesirable (Petty & Wegener, 1991). This biasing impact of emotions is discussed
in the next section.
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Interestingly, if under high thinking conditions
380 there is a positivity bias in thinking as a result of
feeling happy, attitudes would become more
favourable in positive versus negative emotional
states, the same result as under low thinking
conditions. However, the mechanism should be
385 different. In one study examining different roles for
emotions under high and low thinking conditions
mentioned earlier, Petty et al. (1993) demonstrated
how individuals who varied in their likelihood of
thinking showed similar outcomes for emotions on
390 attitudes, but these outcomes were mediated dif-
ferently. Whereas people engaged in a high amount
of thinking showed an impact of emotions on
attitudes that was mediated by their thoughts, for
those not engaged in much thinking, emotions
395 influenced attitudes without influencing thoughts.
In the Petty et al. (1993) research, the happiness
induced by a television programme led to the
generation of more positive thoughts about a
product advertised during the programme, but
400 only in the high thinking conditions. Other
research has shown that happiness can not only
increase the number of positive thoughts generated
but also can increase perceptions of the likelihood
of positive consequences and decrease the likeli-
405 hood of negative consequences, at least when
thinking is high. In one study demonstrating this
(Wegener, Petty, & Klein, 1994), among those
high in need for cognition (a measure of the
propensity to engage in careful thought; Cacioppo
410 & Petty, 1982), happiness (compared to sadness)
increased the persuasiveness of a message that
focused on the positive things that would happen
if a recommended policy was adopted (e.g., stop-
ping smoking increases one’s lifespan), but reduced
415 the persuasiveness of a message that focused on the
negative things that would happen if the same
policy was not adopted (e.g., not stopping smoking
will lead to premature death). Importantly, the
impact of emotion on attitudes was mediated by the
420 perceived likelihoods of the consequences men-
tioned in the message. That is, positive emotions
made positive consequences seem more likely and
negative consequences seem less likely, thereby
increasing the persuasiveness of the message con-
425taining the positive consequences.
The congruence of emotion (e.g., happy/sad)
and message framing (positive/negative) is not only
important for matches in valence. In a conceptually
similar study (DeSteno, Petty, Rucker,Wegener, &
430Braverman, 2004), participants were placed in a sad
or angry state before being exposed to arguments
that articulated the sad or angering consequences
that would occur if a new policy was not adopted.
When the emotion was matched to the message
435frame, persuasion was higher than when it was not
and these effects were once again mediated by the
perceived likelihoods of the angering or sad events
mentioned in the message. Importantly, the match-
ing effect was only present among high need for
440cognition individuals.
Matching the emotional content of arguments
(e.g., happy, sad or angering consequences) to the
type of emotion experienced is one way to enhance
persuasion when thinking is high. Other kinds of
445matching to emotions are also possible. For
example, some emotions are more compatible
than other emotions with certain kinds of argu-
ments. In one demonstration of this, Rucker and
Petty (2004) relied on the finding that some
450emotions (e.g., anger) are more arousing and active
than others which are more passive (e.g., sadness).
They found that when people were given a choice of
two vacation locations—one advertised as a place
full of activity and the other advertised as a place of
455relaxation—those who were made to feel angry
preferred the active resort, but those made to feel
sad preferred the relaxing resort. A conceptually
similar matching effect was obtained by Griskevi-
cius, Shiota, and Nowlis (2010) who found that
460feeing pride versus contentment increased prefer-
ence for self-enhancing over comforting products.3
Before closing our discussion of high elabora-
tion attitude change, it is important to note that
sometimes people may become aware or be
3Emotions can also influence other aspects of thinking such as when positive emotions make thoughts more creative and
flexible (Isen, 1999) or induce a global rather than a local focus (e.g., Fredrickson & Branigan, 2004). We have emphasised
the dimensions most relevant for understanding persuasion.
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465 concerned that emotions are biasing their thoughts
(e.g., if the emotion is especially salient). If people
come to believe that their judgements are some-
how being biased or influenced in an inappropriate
way by their emotions, they may try to adjust or
470 correct their judgements in a direction opposite to
the expected bias (Wegener & Petty, 1997). For
example, if people believed that a happy television
programme was making them feel inappropriately
positively towards the products advertised,
475 they could attempt to debias their judgements by
reporting a less favourable attitude than they
would have in the absence of the perceived bias
(e.g., BerkowiAQ6 tz, Jaffee, Jo, & Troccoli, 2000;
DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Ottati
480 & Isbell, 1996). Of course, not only do people
sometimes try to correct for the unwanted influ-
ence of their emotions on their subsequent
evaluations but they can also try to ignore how
they feel, negate their emotions, suppress them
485 or think about something else when making their
judgements (e.g., Schwarz & Bless, 1992;
Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993).
Emotions can influence the amount
of thinking when elaboration is
490 unconstrained
As we have described, emotions can influence
attitudes when conditions are pre-set to foster
relatively high or low amounts of thinking. For
example, when a message is accompanied by various
495 distracting stimuli, people know that they cannot
exert much effort in processing (i.e., ability to
process is constrained to be low) and when a
message is very high in personal relevance, they
know that it is important to think carefully (i.e.,
500 motivation to process is high). However, in many
situations, people will not already have a clear idea
of how much they are willing or able to think (e.g.,
personal relevance is unclear). Under such moderate
or unconstrained elaboration conditions, the salient
505 concern for people is likely to be how much effort
they should devote to the influence attempt. People
cannot think about every message they receive and
preserving cognitive resources is important. In such
unconstrained contexts, emotional states have been
510shown to impact persuasion by influencing the
extent of processing that occurs. That is, under
these conditions, the emotions a person is experi-
encing can be helpful in deciding whether to think
carefully or not about the persuasive proposal.
515Happiness versus sadness. Most studies on extent
of processing have compared the emotions of
happiness and sadness and there are a number of
theoretical accounts of how these emotions influ-
ence thinking. According to Worth and Mackie
520(1987), happiness interferes with cognitive capacity
as compared to a neutral state resulting in a decrease
in elaborative processing. According to the feelings-
as-information viewpoint (Schwarz & Clore, 1983),
sadness and other negative states indicate that the
525current environment is problematic, motivating a
high level of effortful processing, whereas positive
states indicate that the current environment is safe,
indicating that a low level of cognitive effort is
satisfactory. Tiedens and Linton (2001) came to the
530same conclusion based on an appraisals theory of
emotion (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988) in which
happiness is associated with confidence and sadness
with doubt (Gleicher & Weary, 1991 AQ7). Because of
the confidence associated with happiness, people
535think there is less need to process the message than
when they are feeling more doubtful (e.g., when
sad) and in need of more information.
In accord with all of these notions, the accumu-
lated research suggests that happy individuals often
540engage in less scrutiny of persuasive messages than
sad individuals. Although there are a number of
ways to assess message processing (e.g., recording
the number of thoughts listed about the message,
number of arguments recalled), a popular way to
545assess message scrutiny is by varying the quality of
arguments in the communication (Petty et al.,
1976). When people are processing arguments
carefully, their quality should have a larger impact
on attitudes than when people are not processing
550them carefully. When arguments are not scruti-
nised diligently, attitudes are more influenced by
the mere number of arguments (Petty & Cacioppo,
1984a) or by other simple cues in the persuasion
situation such as source credibility (Petty,
555Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). Thus, when elab-
oration is unconstrained, individuals who are happy
EMOTION AND PERSUASION
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rather than sad have been shown to be less
influenced by argument quality and more influ-
enced by simple cues than sad individuals (e.g.,
560 Worth & Mackie, 1987; Tiedens & Linton,
2001).4
Not all frameworks invariably expect happiness
to be associated with less information processing
than sadness, however. According to the hedonic
565 contingency view (Wegener & Petty, 1994), indivi-
duals in a happy mood wish to maintain this state
and are thus highly sensitive to the hedonic
implications of messages and other stimuli that
they encounter. Because of this, they may be
570 motivated to avoid processing information that
might threaten their happiness (such as the coun-
terattitudinal communications used in most prior
research). In accord with this view,Wegener, Petty,
and Smith (1995) found that happiness did not
575 reduce processing relative to sadness when the
message presented was proattitudinal and uplifting
rather than counterattitudinal and mood threaten-
ing. In contrast, in this situation, happiness pro-
duced larger argument quality effects on attitudes
580 than sadness.
Subsequent research has found that in accord
with the hedonic contingency view, positive mood
is most likely to lead to careful processing when
mood management concerns are salient and pro-
585 cessing will not reduce mood. For instance, in one
study (Cote, 2005), message processing goals
(entertainment versus performance) were manipu-
lated along with expectations about how processing
the message would make people feel (positive or
590 negative), current mood (pleasant or unpleasant)
and message argument quality (strong or weak).
This research revealed a four-way interaction
showing that unpleasant mood produced greater
information processing than positive mood for all
595 conditions except when participants were given an
enjoyment goal and the task was expected to be
pleasant.
Finally, another conceptualisation, the mood
congruency perspective (Ziegler, 2010), argues that
600message processing is enhanced when mood-based
expectancies are disconfirmed rather than con-
firmed. Because people who are happy generally
have more positive expectancies, a counterattitu-
dinal message might be less expected than a
605proattitudinal message and therefore receive more
processing (Ziegler, 2013). Note that on the
surface, at least, this seems to suggest a prediction
opposite to the hedonic contingency view. How-
ever, Ziegler noted that not all counterattitudinal
610messages would be expected to be mood threaten-
ing. In a study aimed at resolving the competing
predictions (Ziegler, Schlett, & Aydinli, 2013), it
was found that the mood congruency theorising
was upheld when a counterattitudinal message was
615not mood threatening (i.e., the counterattitudinal
message tended to be processed more by happy
than by neutral or sad participants), but the
hedonic contingency view was supported when
the same message was made to be threatening by
620inducing reactance (i.e., the counterattitudinal
message tended to be processed less by happy
than neutral or sad participants).
Anger versus surprise. Although most research
has examined happiness versus sadness as an
625instigator of information processing, other emo-
tional states have sometimes been studied. Perhaps
the most investigated is anger versus some control
emotion, and the results have been contradictory.
For example, Moons and Mackie (2007) found
630that people in an angry state processed informa-
tion in a persuasive message more than those in a
neutral state and thus their attitudes were more
influenced by the quality of the arguments in the
message. However, Tiedens and Linton (2001)
635found just the opposite. That is, in their research,
anger, compared to worry, was associated with a
decrease in amount of thinking as revealed by a
reduction in argument quality effects in a persua-
sion paradigm. Similarly, Bodenhausen, Sheppard
640and Kramer (1994 AQ8) found that anger (in compar-
ison to sadness and neutral mood states) led
people to be especially likely to use stereotypes
4Consistent with the idea that sadness is associated with more effortful processing than happiness when receiving
persuasive messages, Bohner and Schwarz (1993) showed that sadness (versus happiness) is also associated with more effort
in the generation of persuasive arguments to convince others.
c:/3b2win/temp files/PCEM_A_967183_O_ANN.3d 1st October 2014 1:38:22
PETTY AND BRIÑOL
8 COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2014, 00 (00)
  
 
and heuristic cues to make judgements rather than
rely on the individuating information (see also
645 Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998). Although it
seems clear from past research on persuasion that
anger can either increase (Moons & Mackie,
2007) or decrease (Tiedens & Linton, 2001)
information processing when the emotion is
650 induced prior to the presentation of the message
or task, it is not clear when these different effects
occur.
We have recently proposed a differential apprai-
sals hypothesis that can provide one possible explana-
655 tion for how both of these effects can occur and the
circumstances under which they are most likely
(Briñol, Petty, Stavraki, Wagner, & Díaz, 2014).
Specifically, we argue that whether anger leads to
more or less thinking about the persuasive message
660 depends on the kind of appraisal that is highlighted
(see Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013;
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). That is, if angry
individuals focus on the relatively cognitive
appraisal of certainty that can accompany anger
665 (Humrichouse & Watson, 2010), they may feel
confident in their existing views and therefore avoid
processing new information. In these circum-
stances, anger would be associated with reduced
argument quality effects on attitudes. On the other
670 hand, if angry individuals focused on the more
affective appraisal of valence (i.e., unpleasantness)
that also can accompany the emotion, they are more
likely to come to view their current opinions
negatively and perhaps in need of change. If so,
675 angry people would elaborate information more
extensively leading to enhanced argument quality
effects.
In order to test the differential appraisals
prediction for anger, we conducted a series of
680 studies (see Briñol et al., 2014) comparing anger
(unpleasant but confident appraisal) to surprise
which is a relatively pleasant state (Watson &
Tellegen, 1985; Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, &
Gilbert, 2005) that is associated with doubt or
685 uncertainty (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Although
surprise can sometimes be negative in valence, it is
typically more positive in appraisal than anger. In
one of the studies, participants first were assigned
to write about personal episodes in which they felt
690anger or surprise. Following this emotion manip-
ulation but before reading the persuasive message,
a mindset manipulation was introduced which was
intended to vary the extent to which the affective
(valence) or cognitive (certainty) appraisal asso-
695ciated with their emotional state would dominate.
Mindset was manipulated by asking participants
to fill in the missing letters in a word-completion
task. Participants in the affective mindset condition
had to fill in the letters of words related to feelings
700(e.g., feel, emotion) and several neutral words (e.g.,
table, chair). In contrast, participants in the cog-
nitive mindset condition filled in the letters of
words related to thinking (e.g., thought, elabora-
tion) as well as the letters of the same neutral words.
705In the affective mindset condition, participants
were expected to focus primarily on the valence
(pleasantness or unpleasantness) of their emotion,
whereas in the cognitive mindset condition, parti-
cipants were expected to focus primarily on the
710confidence or doubt accompanying their emotion.
Following these two inductions, participants
received strong or weak arguments about a campus
issue and then reported their attitudes towards the
advocacy. The results were consistent with the
715differential appraisal prediction outlined above. In
the cognitive appraisal conditions, anger produced
less thinking than surprise (as revealed by a reduced
argument quality effect on attitudes when angry
than surprised). In contrast, when participants
720focused on the affective appraisal of pleasantness,
anger produced more thinking than surprise (as
shown by an increased argument quality effect
when angry than surprised).
The Briñol et al.’ s (2014) research is unique in
725varying the type of appraisal that was activated and
then examining the consequences of those differ-
ent appraisals for the very same emotion. Thus,
these findings contribute not only to the literature
on emotion and persuasion but also to the
730literature on appraisal theories of emotion (e.g.,
Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Lerner & Keltner,
2000; Moors et al., 2013; Smith & Ellsworth,
1985). Most notably, these results open the door
to many other appraisal variations for other
735complex emotions such as disgust and fear.
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Although our research has focused on manip-
ulating whether cognitive or affective appraisals
dominate, it is also possible that there are individual
differences in whether cognitive or affective apprai-
740 sals would naturally come to mind. For example,
when focused on “ideal” versus “ought” goals
(Higgins, 1987), people are more reliant on their
affective experiences (Pham & Tamar, 2004AQ9 ), and
some people in general are more likely to favour
745 reliance on affective influences over cognitive
influences (e.g., See, Fabrigar, & Petty, 2013; See,
Petty, & Fabrigar, 2008). These factors might
influence the appraisals that come to mind sponta-
neously and future research should address this
750 possibility.
Summary. The results of the studies on emo-
tions and information processing under uncon-
strained elaboration conditions that we reviewed
clearly indicate that whether a given emotion will
755 be associated with enhanced or reduced informa-
tion processing depends on a number of factors
such as what goals the person has at the time (e.g.,
entertainment versus performance) or what mind-
set they are in (affective versus cognitive) or what
760 assumptions they make about what effects proces-
sing the message will have (e.g., will it be
depressing or uplifting). Notably, however, in
accord with the ELM, emotions tend to influence
the extent of information processing when the
765 level is not already pre-set by other variables in the
persuasion situation to be very high or low.
THE IMPACT OF EMOTIONS ON
SECONDARY COGNITION
The previous sectionsAQ10 focused on how emotions
770 change what or how much people think about a
persuasive message thereby influencing attitudes
and the degree of persuasion. As noted earlier,
emotions can not only influence these processes
but can also impact what people think about their
775 own thoughts (Briñol, Petty & Barden, 2007).
The notion that emotions can affect reliance on
thoughts stems in part from the finding just
described that emotional states can relate to
appraisals of certainty or doubt.5 For example,
780the emotions of happiness and anger can lead
people to feel more certain in their appraisal of the
situation than other emotions such as sadness or
surprise (Ellsworth & Smith, 1985; AQ11Tiedens &
Linton, 2001). If this sense of certainty is applied
785or misattributed to one’s thoughts (e.g., I feel
certain that my thoughts are correct), it would lead
to greater use of those thoughts—a process we
refer to as cognitive validation (Petty et al., 2007).
As also noted earlier, people can make valence
790appraisals of their emotions. Thus, relatively
positive emotions such as happiness and surprise
can lead people to feel more pleasant than sad or
angry states and if this feeling of pleasantness is
applied or misattributed to one’s thoughts (e.g.,
795I like my thoughts; my thoughts make me feel
good) it would lead to greater use of those
thoughts than negatively appraised emotions—a
process we refer to as affective validation (Petty
et al., 2007). In this section, we first review work
800on the emotions of happiness and sadness for
which these two appraisals (i.e., valence and
certainty) operate in the same direction, and then
we move to more complex emotions—anger and
surprise—for which these are opposite.
805Happiness (versus sadness) can
affect reliance on thoughts
Previous research on emotion has shown that
feeling happy can increase the reliance a wide
variety of information that happens to be access-
810ible at the time, including behavioural scripts
(Bless et al., 1996), expectations (Bodenhausen,
Kramer, & Süsser, 1994) and general categories
(Isen & Daubman, 1984). These studies suggest
that happy versus sad states can influence the
815validity with which people hold their available
thoughts, regardless of the type or nature of those
5 In accord with prior use in the literature on attitudes and persuasion (Petty et al., 2007; Rucker, Tormala, Petty, &
Briñol, 2014), we consider the terms certainty and confidence as similar in meaning and will therefore use them in
interchangeably in this review.
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thoughts (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Huntsinger
& Clore, 2012). Applied to persuasion, this leads
to the prediction that if thoughts are favourable to
820 the advocated position, then happiness (as
opposed to sadness) will facilitate the use of those
positive thoughts, leading to more persuasion. On
the other hand, if thoughts are unfavourable, then
happiness (as opposed to sadness) will facilitate
825 reliance on those negative thoughts, leading to less
persuasion.
Research on happiness versus sadness confirms
these predictions. In one study, Briñol et al. (2007)
had college students read a strong or weak message
830 advocating that they should be required to carry
personal identification cards on campus. The strong
message elicited mostly positive thoughts and the
weak message elicited mostly negative thoughts.
Then, following message processing, the students
835 were asked to recall prior situations in which they
were happy or sad. Note that the emotion was
induced following message processing to enhance
the likelihood of validation effects. As demon-
strated in the research reviewer earlier, if emotions
840 are induced prior to message receipt, then they can
influence the extent of message processing or
produce a bias to the on-going processing. In any
case, the results of this study showed that for people
receiving the strong arguments and generating
845 mostly favourable thoughts, persuasion was greater
when happy than sad consistent with greater
reliance on the positive thoughts already generated.
However, for those receiving weak arguments and
generating mostly unfavourable thoughts, persua-
850 sion was reduced when happy than sad consistent
with greater reliance on the negative thoughts
already generated.
In this study, after the emotion induction task
but before measuring attitudes towards the pro-
855 posal, participants were asked to think back to the
thoughts they listed about the proposal and to rate
their overall confidence in those thoughts. As
predicted, there was a significant effect of emotion
on reported thought confidence with happy indi-
860 viduals expressing more thought confidence than
those who were sad. Furthermore, this thought
confidence mediated the effect of emotion on
attitudes. In short, this research demonstrated for
the first time in the domain of attitude change that
865emotional states can operate by validation pro-
cesses. In additional studies, the same interaction
between argument quality (strong, weak) and
emotion (happy, sad) was replicated with different
emotion inductions (e.g., using the Velten,
8701968 AQ12procedure; using facial expressions, Paredes,
Stavraki, Briñol, & Petty, 2013), other procedures
to measure thought confidence (e.g., assessing
confidence in each individual thought rather than
collectively), and regardless of whether thought
875confidence was measured before or after attitudes
(see Briñol et al., 2007).
Taken together, these studies suggest that
happiness can validate what people think relative
to sadness. As noted earlier, happiness could lead
880people to rely on their mental contents more than
sadness because people are more confident in their
thoughts when happy (cognitive validation), or
because people feel good about their thoughts
(affective validation). Our work on happiness and
885sadness does not allow these possibilities to be
disentangled because both emotions work in the
same direction on the affective (pleasantness–
unpleasantness) and cognitive (confidence–doubt)
dimensions.
890Anger (versus surprise) can affect reliance
on thoughts
Some emotions, such as anger and surprise, do not
have the appraisals of pleasantness and confidence
naturally confounded. As explained earlier, anger
895is an unpleasant emotion that is associated with
confidence, whereas surprise is a relatively pleasant
emotion associated with doubt (Ellsworth &
Smith, 1988; Tiedens & Linton, 2001; see also,
Blankenship, Nesbit, & Murray, 2013). Consist-
900ent with the differential appraisals of these emo-
tions, we hypothesised that if an individual was
focused on the cognitive appraisal of confidence/
doubt, then feeling angry should lead to more
thought use than surprise because anger would
905enhance confidence in one’s thoughts—cognitive
validation. In contrast, if an individual was focused
on the affective appraisal of pleasantness/unplea-
santness, then feeling angry should lead to less
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thought use than surprise because anger would
910 enhance perceptions of feeling bad about or
disliking one’s thoughts—affective (in)validation.
Furthermore, these validation effects for emotion
should occur mostly when people have already
generated their thoughts and are considering their
915 validity—not when the emotions are induced prior
to message processing.
We examined whether the emotions of anger
and surprise can have opposite effects on the use of
one’s own thoughts depending on whether the
920 emotion is appraised in a cognitive or affective
manner. In one study (Briñol et al., 2014), partici-
pants first were asked to think about their best or
worst qualities as job candidates. This manipulation
was designed to produce positive or negative self-
925 related thoughts. Following this thought direction
manipulation, participants were assigned to write
about personal episodes in which they felt either
anger or surprise. After participants completed both
inductions, the critical mindset manipulation was
930 introduced in order to focus participants’ attention
on the affective (pleasantness/ unpleasantness)
appraisal of emotion or the cognitive (confidence/
doubt) appraisal. As in a study described earlier, the
mindset manipulation required participants to fill
935 in the blanks of words related to cognition (e.g.,
thought) or emotion (e.g., feel). Finally, partici-
pants rated themselves as job candidates on various
attitude scales.
As predicted, when in the cognitive mindset,
940 angry individuals used their thoughts more than
surprised participants (presumably reflecting con-
fidence from anger and doubt from surprise).
Greater use of thoughts was demonstrated by a
larger impact of thought direction on self-ratings
945 for those who were angry rather than surprised.
However, when in the affective mindset, angry
individuals used their thoughts less than surprised
participants (presumably reflecting an unpleasant-
ness appraisal from anger and a relatively pleasant
950 appraisal from surprise). Less use of thoughts was
demonstrated by a smaller impact of thought
direction on self-ratings among those who were
angry rather than surprised. As was the case for
our research on happiness versus sadness, the same
955 interaction of emotion (anger, surprise) and
thought direction (positive, negative) was found
when other inductions, materials and measures
were used (see Briñol et al., 2014).
To our knowledge, this research provides the
960first demonstration that the emotions of anger and
surprise can influence evaluations by influencing
reliance on thoughts. As noted earlier, our initial
work on self-validation showed that positive emo-
tions such as happiness can enhance thought use
965relative to a negative emotion such as sadness
(Briñol et al., 2007). However, this more recent
line of research suggests that negative emotions
associated with confidence can enhance thought
use relative to positive emotions, but only if people
970are in a cognitive mindset, interpreting their
emotions along a confidence versus doubt con-
tinuum. Also, these studies are important in
revealing that the same emotion can sometimes
increase thought use and sometimes decrease
975thought use.
The potential for emotions to validate mental
content goes beyond the domain of attitudes and
persuasion. Consider, for example, work on numer-
ical anchoring in which people adjust their numer-
980ical estimates to questions (e.g., how old was
George Washington when he died?) based on a
salient and irrelevant anchor value (e.g., a number
revealed on a spun wheel of fortune; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1972 AQ13). Recent research by Inbar and
985Gilovich (2011) examined the effects of high-
certainty emotions such as anger on the anchoring
effect. In particular, they found that compared to
emotions associated with appraisals of uncertainty
such as fear and sadness, emotions associated with
990certainty led people to rely on self-generated
anchors to a greater extent producing a larger
anchoring effect. Similar results have been found
for other potential inductions of thought-confid-
ence beyond the domain of emotions (e.g., see
995Epley and Gilovich, 2001 AQ14).
Disgust (versus sadness) can affect
reliance on thoughts
As illustrated so far, understanding the different
appraisals that can be associated with emotions
1000explains how emotions can have seemingly opposite
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effects depending on the circumstances and also
leads to the prediction of new effects. In the
previous section, we focused on the emotions of
anger and surprise which can have opposite effects
1005 depending on the appraisal that dominates. In this
section, we focus on another complex emotion for
which the confidence and pleasantness appraisal is
mismatched: disgust. That is, disgust is an unpleas-
ant emotional state that is associated with confid-
1010 ence. Thus, we reasoned that disgust would
enhance the impact of accessible thoughts on social
judgements, compared to another negative but
doubt-inducing emotion, but only when a cognitive
appraisal of the emotion is made.
1015 To examine a validation role for disgust, in one
study college students were asked to list either three
positive or three negative characteristics that they
possessed as potential job candidates (Wagner,
Briñol, & Petty, 2014). Then, the participants
1020 were required to write a short essay describing a
recent occasion on which they felt either disgusted
or sad. This induction was presented as part of
separate study for the Cognitive Science Depart-
ment in order to place participants in a cognitive
1025 mindset. Following prior research (e.g., Schnall,
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan 2008), sadness was selected
as the comparison emotion because although sad-
ness and disgust are both unpleasant, disgust and
sadness differ in the extent to which they are
1030 associated with feelings of certainty.
After writing about their traits and emotional
experiences, participants answered a series of atti-
tude questions about themselves as job candidates.
In accord with the self-validation logic, the results
1035 showed that when participants generated positive
thoughts about themselves, disgust led to more
positive self-judgements. Conversely, when parti-
cipants generated negative self-relevant thoughts,
disgust led to more negative (or less positive) self-
1040 judgements. In a subsequent study, the interac-
tion between emotion (disgust, sadness) and
thoughts (positive, negative) on attitudes was
replicated when people wrote about three morally
positive or three morally negative behaviours
1045engaged in by a friend (see Zhong & Liljenquist,
2006) and the polarising impact of disgust on
judgements of the friend was mediated by thought
confidence (Wagner et al., 2014).
Demonstrating that disgust can polarise moral
1050judgements is important because it suggests for the
first time that disgust can impact moral judgements
via a relatively complex, meta-cognitive process
involving validation of whatever one is thinking,
as opposed to a process that relies on linking
1055feelings of disgust uniquely with moral disapproval.
Except in the particular domain of physical and
spiritual purity (Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011),
most of the previous research has shown that
disgust (versus other negative emotions) fosters
1060more negative judgements in terms of moral
condemnation (e.g., Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley
& Haidt, 2006). A common explanation for this
effect is that disgust and moral reasoning are
intimately related, such that disgust serves as a
1065negative signal when judging the moral status of an
action or person (Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011).
However, our research suggested another possibil-
ity—that because disgust is associated with feelings
of certainty, disgust (relative to low-certainty emo-
1070tions such as sadness) can polarise judgements
regardless of topic and the direction of one’s
thoughts. Thus, our self-validation paradigm
revealed that disgust can make negative moral
judgements more negative, but also positive moral
1075judgements more positive. Future research should
examine disgust under an affective mindset. The
affective validation prediction is that the feeling of
unpleasantness from disgust should undermine
thought use compared to more pleasant states.6
1080Arousal can polarise thoughts
So far, we have described how different emotions
can cognitively or affectively validate thoughts
depending on the appraisal of the emotion that is
highlighted. In addition to these appraisals, there
6 If the unpleasant feeling from disgust is analysed as an argument, however, it would likely support more negative moral
judgements but not more positive ones, or disgust could make moral infractions seem worse or more likely (see earlier section
on emotions as arguments and as biasing cognition).
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1085 is another aspect of emotions that might also
influence thought reliance—arousal. A number of
studies have shown that arousal can magnify the
effect of any thought previously activated in
people’s mind, polarising subsequent judgements
1090 (e.g., Stangor, 1990; Storbeck & Clore, 2008). To
date, however, it is not yet clear if this is due to
arousal validating thoughts or some other mech-
anism such as arousal affecting the extent of
thinking.
1095 Indeed, arousal has been postulated to increase
processing of persuasive messages and produce
enhanced argument quality effects when it gives
people the burst of energy they need to think
(Martin, Laing, Martin, & Mitchell, 2005). How-
1100 ever, arousal has also been argued to decrease
processing of persuasive messages (reducing argu-
ment quality effects) when it is experienced as
stressful and difficult to handle (DAQ15 eMiguel et al.,
2009). In addition to the level of arousal, other
1105 factors can moderate the impact of arousal on
information processing and persuasion, such as
the extent to which people want to maintain their
current level of arousal (Di Muro &Murray, 2014),
the meaning associated with arousal (Jamieson,
1110 Mendes, & Nock, 2013) and the extent to which
it is perceived to be a biasing factor (Sinclair,
Hoffman, Mark, Martin, & Pickering, 1994).
Future research should focus on the specific
mechanisms by which arousal influences attitudes.
1115 As articulated further below, we would expect that
arousal would influence the extent of information
processing when it precedes the message but could
affect validation processes when it follows proces-
sing. Of course, in accord with the ELM, other
1120 roles for arousal are also possible such as serving as
a simple cue when thinking is low or being
assessed as an argument when thinking is high.
Emotion can affect reliance on thought
processes
1125 In the preceding sections, we have seen how
emotions can affect reliance on thoughts and
thereby influence attitudes and other judgements.
In a series of studies under their affect as
information umbrella, Clore and Huntsinger
1130(2007) have argued and shown that emotions can
affect reliance not only on particular thoughts as
highlighted by the self-validation approach
described earlier (Briñol et al., 2007) but also on
particular thought processes. In an illustrative
1135study (Huntsinger, Clore, & Bar-Anan, 2010),
participants completed several tasks designed to
prime a broad, global focus in information proces-
sing or a narrow, local focus. After this task,
participants were asked to write about either a
1140happy or a sad event. The impact of the initial
prime (global versus local) was assessed by the
performance on a standard Navon (1977) letter
task in which participants have to indicate what
letter they see in a figure with a big letter
1145composed of many small letters (e.g., the capital
letter H made up of lower case l’s). To prime a
global focus, participants responded to a number
of trials in which they were to identify the global
letter (i.e., the H), whereas to prime a local focus,
1150the trials focused on identifying the lowercase
letter (l) that made up the larger letter. Consistent
with the idea that emotion can validate thought
styles, the results indicated that the primed cog-
nitive style was more influential in affecting
1155subsequent performance for happy than sad parti-
cipants. Described differently, when a global focus
was primed (and therefore dominant), happy
participants showed a more broadened focus than
sad participants. In contrast, when a local focus
1160was dominant, happy participants displayed a
more narrowed focus than sad participants (see
also, Huntsinger, 2014, for a conceptually similar
result). These results were interpreted as evidence
that emotions can provide a green light or red
1165light (cf., Martin et al., 1993) to follow one’s
mental inclinations (Clore & Huntsinger, 2009 AQ16;
Huntsinger, 2013a).
In another relevant study (Koo, Clore, Kim, &
Choi, 2012), the impact of emotion on analytic
1170versus holistic styles of reasoning was investigated.
Prior research had shown that individuals in the
Western part of the world tend to use an analytical
style of reasoning, whereas Easterners tend to
think in a more holistic way (Nisbett, Peng, Choi,
1175& Norenzayan, 2001). European American and
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South Korean students were placed in either a
happy or a sad state by having them write about
situations in which they experienced these emo-
tions. Following the emotion manipulation, they
1180 responded to a task in which they read about a
murder case and were given a list of many possible
causal factors that could have been involved.
Participants were to indicate which of the factors
they believed were relevant to the case. Including
1185 many causal factors is viewed as a sign of holistic
thinking (Choi, Dalal, Kim-Prieto, & Park,
2003). For the Koreans, a happy mood led to the
inclusion of more causal factors as relevant to the
case than a sad mood. For the European Amer-
1190 icans, however, the trend was opposite. Viewed
differently, in a happy mood, the normal pattern
emerged such that Easterners included more
causal factors than Westerners. In the sad mood,
however, this normal effect was eliminated. Put in
1195 self-validation terms, the results of the Huntsinger
et al. and Koo et al. studies show that emotions
can validate or invalidate dominant cognitive styles
just as they can validate or invalidate dominant
(accessible) mental contents.
1200 Matching emotions to contexts can
validate thoughts
So far, we have focused on the role of individual
emotions in affecting judgement since most
research uses this paradigm, but some research
1205 has examined how emotions when combined with
various contexts can work to validate thinking. In
the broader literature on persuasion, there is
abundant evidence that matching variables in the
persuasion setting (e.g., using an Hispanic source
1210 with an Hispanic audience) can influence persua-
sion through the same psychological processes
described in this review (Petty, Wheeler, & Bizer,
2000). That is, matching source to audience, or
message to audience, or source to message so that
1215 they are congruent in some way (versus incon-
gruent) can lead to persuasion by affecting the
same processes described so far. Specifically,
matching can affect attitudes by serving as a
simple cue when elaboration is low, serving as an
1220argument or biasing thoughts or validating them
when elaboration is high, and by influencing the
amount of information processing when elabora-
tion is moderate (see Briñol, & Petty, 2006 AQ17).
In one matching study exploring self-validation
1225processes, Evans and Clark (2012) showed that
people demonstrated increased reliance on their
thoughts when the characteristics of the message
source were compatible with (i.e., matched) the
characteristics of the message recipient. Applying a
1230similar logic to emotions, Huntsinger (2013b) has
shown that a match (versus mismatch) between
emotions and activated evaluative concepts can
influence the confidence with which people hold
their thoughts. In this research, participants first
1235read a message containing strong or weak argu-
ments for senior comprehensive exams and listed
their thoughts. Then, they received the emotional
congruence (matching) manipulation. Specifically,
participants listened to either a happy or sad
1240musical selection and then completed a lexical
decision task on the computer in which they were
subliminally primed with either happy (e.g., smile)
or sad (e.g., glum) words. Affective coherence
(matching) occurred when happy or sad music
1245was paired with similarly valenced prime words
and incoherence (mismatching) occurred when
happy or sad music was paired with oppositely
valenced prime words.
Consistent with the notion that affective coher-
1250ence (matching) could validate thoughts, partici-
pants in the affective coherence conditions showed
a larger effect of argument quality on attitudes than
those in the incoherence condition. Furthermore,
in this study, participants were asked to report the
1255confidence they had in the thoughts they listed
about the persuasive message, using the same
measure introduced by Briñol et al. (2007). Con-
sistent with the self-validation predictions, affective
coherence led people to have more confidence in
1260their thoughts and this thought confidence
mediated the impact of emotional coherence on
attitudes.
In closing this section, it is worth noting that
affective coherence (or any other form of matching)
1265might influence attitude change by the other
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mechanisms specified by the ELM under other
circumstances (Petty et al., 2000). For example, one
possibility is that when the emotional tone of a
message is matched to the emotion of the person
1270 and thinking is constrained to be relatively low,
people might come to accept the message position
simply because the message “feels right” or “fits”
(Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004) or is easier to
process (e.g., Lee & Aaker, 2004)—a simple cue
1275 effect. In accord with the ELM, these fluency or fit
experiences might influence attitudes through other
processes under other circumstances (see Briñol,
Tormala, & Petty, 2013AQ18 ; and Cesario, Higgins, &
Scholer, 2008, for reviews of the multiple processes
1280 by which fluency and fit can operate).
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
COGNITION
In addition to identifying thought confidence as a
1285 mediator of the impact of emotion on judgement
under certain circumstances, prior work on self-
validation processes has also pointed to specific
moderators of this meta-cognitive process. In this
section, we specify the two most studied variables
1290 that influence the operation of self-validation
processes: timing of the induction and extent of
elaboration.
Timing
As may be apparent from our description of prior
1295 studies, the timing of an emotion induction (i.e.,
when it is salient) is one important moderator of
the process by which it has its effect. Specifically,
for emotion to serve as a thought validator
(regardless of whether it relates to confidence or
1300 pleasantness), the emotion should be salient at the
time people are thinking about their thoughts
rather than prior to thought generation. A number
of studies have documented the different roles that
variables can play depending on whether they are
1305 induced before or after message processing. For
example, in one series of studies, individuals
received a self-affirmation induction (i.e., thinking
about their core values) just before or just after
they received a persuasive message (Briñol, Petty,
1310Gallardo, & DeMarree, 2007). When the self-
affirmation induction came prior to the message, it
affected the extent of message processing such that
affirmed participants processed the message less
than non-affirmed individuals. This is because
1315when already affirmed, people can be confident in
their existing views and have little need to think
about new information. But, when the affirmation
induction followed the message, it impacted the
use of participants’ thoughts. Specifically, affirmed
1320participants relied on their thoughts to the mess-
age more than non-affirmed individuals. As a
result, affirmation decreased argument quality
effects when it preceded the message relative to
non-affirmation (a result of reduced message
1325processing), but increased argument quality effects
when it followed the message (a result of enhanced
use of thoughts to the message). The same results
have been observed when feelings of power were
introduced prior to or after message processing
1330(B AQ19riñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007).
In conceptually similar work in which the
timing of an emotion induction was manipulated,
Huntsinger (2013b) had participants read a per-
suasive message containing either strong or weak
1335arguments for a proposal. Just prior to or following
the message, participants were exposed to the
emotional coherence (matching) manipulation
described earlier (i.e., positive or negative emo-
tions were paired with positive or negative
1340primes). In accord with the self-affirmation and
power studies just mentioned, Huntsinger found
that when the emotional coherence manipulation
came prior to the message, it affected the extent of
message processing such that the coherent condi-
1345tion participants processed the message less than
the incoherence condition participants. The inco-
herence of the emotion and the primed words
presumably led to doubts that were resolved with
greater processing. However, when the coherence
1350manipulation followed the message, it impacted
the use of participants’ thoughts to the message
with coherent individuals relying on their thoughts
more than those in the incoherence condition. As
a result, emotional coherence decreased argument
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1355 quality effects when it preceded the message
(a result of reduced message processing in the
coherence condition), but increased argument
quality effects when it followed the message
(a result of enhanced use of thoughts to the
1360 message in the coherence condition).
Extent of elaboration
In the ELM, elaboration is a key determinant of
the route to persuasion and the particular process
by which variables have their impact on judge-
1365 ments. For example, we have seen that when the
likelihood of elaboration is low, emotions can
affect attitudes by serving as simple affective cues
producing judgements in accord with their valence
but that when elaboration is high, emotions work
1370 by more thoughtful means such as serving as
arguments, biasing thoughts or validating them.
Recall that in one early demonstration of multiple
roles for emotion under high and low elaboration
conditions (Petty et al., 1993), emotion had an
1375 indirect impact on attitudes by biasing thoughts
when elaboration was high but had a direct effect
on attitudes when elaboration was low.
The moderated mediation pattern found in
ELM research is indicative of the different mech-
1380 anism of attitude change under high and low
thinking conditions. The low thinking results are
what would be expected from relatively low effort
theories of attitude change such as classical con-
ditioning (Staats & Staats, 1958) or the use of an
1385 “affect heuristic” (Chaiken, 1987). Under high
thinking conditions, however, the indirect influ-
ence observed is what would be expected from
relatively high effort theories of the use of emotion
such as the “affect infusion” (Forgas, 1995) or
1390 emotion “priming” (Greifeneder et al., 2011)
accounts in which emotions are said to make
retrieval and generation of affectively congruent
cognitive material more likely.
According to the ELM, however, these are just
1395 two of the roles that variables can play in
persuasion settings. As described earlier, self-
validation provides another means by which emo-
tions can influence attitudes when thinking is high.
Petty, Briñol, and Tormala (2002) demonstrated
1400that self-validation is more likely to take place
when people have the requisite motivation and
ability to attend to and interpret their own
cognitive experiences. There are at least two
reasons for this. First, for validation processes to
1405matter, people need to have some thoughts to
validate. Second, people need substantial motiva-
tion and ability not only to think at the primary
level of cognition but also to think and care about
their own thoughts. In line with this reasoning, a
1410growing body of research suggests that the meta-
cognitive process of validation requires a fair
amount of cognitive effort, as individuals need
both the motivation and ability to generate
thoughts and to subsequently assess them (Petty
1415et al., 2007).
In one study on emotion and validation, Briñol
et al. (2007) had participants read a persuasive
message about a new foster care programme
composed of either strong or weak arguments.
1420An emotion induction in which people were
required to behave according to a happy or sad
script followed the message. To assess the likely
extent of thinking about the message received,
need for cognition (NC AQ20) was measured (Cacioppo
1425& Petty, 1982). The key result on the attitude
measure was a three-way interaction of Need for
cognition, Argument Quality and Emotion. As
predicted by the self-validation perspective, for
individuals who were high in need for cognition,
1430when a strong message was received (and thoughts
were thus mostly favourable), those who were
happy following message processing were more
persuaded than those who were sad. However,
when participants received a weak message on the
1435same topic (and thoughts were mostly unfavour-
able), the effects of the emotion induction were
reversed. Put differently, for individuals high in
need for cognition, emotion interacted with argu-
ment quality to determine attitudes. This is the
1440effect we mentioned earlier when first discussing
the role of happiness in validating thoughts.
However, the results were very different for
those who were low in need for cognition. For
these individuals, there was only a main effect for
1445emotions with those who were happy expressing
more positive attitudes than those who were sad.
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That is, for low NC individuals, feeling good
following the message acted as a simple cue
leading to more positive attitudes when happy
1450 than sad regardless of argument quality. This is
consistent with prior research suggesting that low
elaboration individuals are more likely to use their
emotions as input to a low thought affect heuristic
(e.g., Petty et al., 1993).
1455 In short, in research examining the moderating
role of extent of elaboration, when emotions were
induced prior to a message, low elaboration
individuals showed a simple cue effect for emotion
but for high elaboration individuals, emotions
1460 biased processing (Petty et al., 1993). However,
when emotions were induced after the message
was processed, low elaboration individuals still
showed a simple cue effect for emotion, but for
high elaboration individuals, emotion influenced
1465 validation of the thoughts generated. Thus, to
have a full picture of the process by which
emotions influence judgements, it is important to
consider both the timing of the emotion and the
overall extent of thinking in the situation.
1470 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This review has described the various ways in
which emotions can influence attitudes according
to the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty &
Briñol, 2012). In agreement with the ELM, we
1475 have seen that emotions work in different ways
depending on the extent of elaboration and the
timing of the emotion. Emotions serve as simple
cues when thinking is constrained to be low but
serve as arguments when relevant, bias the cognit-
1480 ive processing of the message or validate thoughts
when thinking is high. When thinking is uncon-
strained, emotions tend to influence how much
thinking takes place. Emotions are most likely to
serve in a validation role when they come after
1485 careful message processing but they are most likely
to bias thinking when they come before, assuming
the extent of thinking is high and the arguments
are not so clearly strong or weak that differential
argument construal is difficult. If thinking is low,
1490emotions can serve as simple affective cues
whether they come before or after the message.
We have also seen that all of the general
processes of influence for emotion incorporated
into the ELM have been separately articulated in
1495various different specific theoretical frameworks
such as (1) classical conditioning (Staats & Staats,
1987 AQ21) for cue effects, (2) mood as input (Martin
et al., 1993) for treating emotions as arguments,
(3) feelings as information (Schwarz & Clore,
15001983) for emotions affecting the extent of proces-
sing,7 (4) affect infusion (Forgas, 1995) for biased
processing effects, and (5) self-validation (Briñol
et al., 2007; Petty et al., 2002) and the affect
as information (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007)
1505approaches emphasising thought validation or
confidence implications of emotions. Some theories
of emotions have even considered more than one
role (e.g., see Forgas, 2005 AQ22), but none have
incorporated all of them.
1510Furthermore, although we have not focused on
it here, the ELM holds that when emotions (or
other variables) influence attitudes by mechanisms
requiring little cognitive effort, the attitudes are
weaker (less stable, resistant and predictive of
1515behaviour) than when emotions influence attitudes
by higher thought mechanisms (Petty, Haugtvedt,
& Smith, 1995). For example, if happiness were to
produce the same favourable attitude by serving as
a cue and by biasing thoughts, the latter attitude
1520would have more strength. This is not to say that
simple cue processes cannot lead to some strength
consequences such as the stability that might come
from repeatedly pairing an attitude object with an
emotional state. And, if this repeated pairing leads
1525to an attitude that is highly accessible (Fazio, 1995),
it could guide behaviour in spontaneous situations
where thinking is relatively low (Dovidio Kawakami,
Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Strick, Hol-
land, van Baaren, van Knilppenbert, & Dijksterhuis,
7 Some researchers treat the “feelings as information” view as focused solely on the “direct” impact of emotions on
judgements (i.e., as a simple misattributional inference) and exclude the enhanced processing role (see Greifeneder
et al., 2011).
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1530 2013). However, since cue-based attitudes have little
substantive foundation, they would be more likely to
succumb to an attacking message and fail to guide
behaviour when people think before acting. Unfor-
tunately, there is very little work investigating the
1535 strength properties of attitudes induced with differ-
ent emotion mechanisms. Thus, this topic is ripe for
future research.
Nonetheless, the ELM integrates five core
processes into one framework, and perhaps most
1540 importantly, unlike the specific theories of emo-
tion, the ELM holds that the very same funda-
mental mechanisms and processes we have used to
understand emotions can be applied to a host of
other variables that have nothing to do with
1545 emotion. For instance, source credibility has been
shown to serve in the identical roles as emotion
under the very same circumstances and moderat-
ing conditions (see Briñol & Petty, 2009, for a
review of multiple roles for source effects; see Petty
1550 & Wegener, 1998, for a review of multiple roles
for other variables).
Our review also reinforced the notion that
understanding the dimensions along which emo-
tions are appraised can be very helpful in making
1555 predictions about what outcomes to expect. In
particular, the appraisals along an affective/valence
(pleasantness/unpleasantness) versus a cognitive/
certainty (confidence/doubt) dimension are espe-
cially important when they differ as is the case for
1560 the relatively complex emotions of anger, surprise
and disgust. We have seen that if the confidence
(cognitive appraisal) that emerges from an emo-
tion such as anger comes prior to message
exposure, and elaboration is not constrained to be
1565 high or low, its role in the persuasion process is
likely to be a reduction of elaboration. This is
consistent with previous research showing that the
certainty value of emotions impacts the extent of
processing when emotion is varied prior to mess-
1570 age exposure (Tiedens & Linton, 2001).
If the confidence associated with anger is made
salient after extensive message processing, however,
it affects reliance on the thoughts that have been
generated. As noted throughout this review, these
1575findings are also consistent with current theories of
emotion that suggest that affect can influence one’s
confidence in the validity of mental contents and
provides individuals with information about the
appropriateness of relying on activated information
1580(Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). Of course, for emo-
tions such as anger and surprise to operate through
confidence or doubt, people have to appraise their
emotions in a cognitive mindset. As described, if
the pleasantness dimensions of these complex
1585emotions are made salient, then their effects on
information processing and thought validation
could reverse.
In closing, we further note that although we
have applied the differential appraisals notion only
1590to the roles of affecting information processing and
validating thoughts, these appraisals are also relev-
ant to the other roles for variables specified by the
ELM. For example, when anger serves as a simple
cue under low thinking conditions, we argued that
1595it would produce effects consistent with its valence.
On the pleasantness dimension, the valence of
anger is negative leading to a prediction that anger
would lead people to make more negative judge-
ments such as providing harsher punishments to
1600others (Lerner et al., 1998). On the other hand,
however, if the confidence interpretation of anger
was salient, this is positive in valence and could
lead people to be more optimistic about the future
(Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; see
1605also, Veling, Ruys, & Aarts, 2011).
Were these emotional AQ23appraisals to be induced
prior to a message when elaboration was con-
strained to be high, they might lead to attitudinally
biased information processing. For example, con-
1610sistent with this logic, research by Adaval (2001)
showed that the confidence given to a product
attribute is greater when the current emotion
matches the valence of the attribute. That is,
when happy, positively viewed attributes were given
1615more weight in determining attitudes, and when
sad, negatively viewed attributes were given more
weight (see DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker,
2000, for a similar account based on specific
emotions). Future research should examine these
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1620 additional roles for the confidence and the plea-
santness appraisals of emotions.
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